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Doing Without Privacy
THOMAS GERETY*
It's not often you find a real bargain in legal theory. But then it's not often
you find a retailer like John Hart Ely.
A theory, as the Greek suggests, is a way of looking at something. The
grander the theory, the more it takes in. The costs of inclusion, however, can
go pretty high; to take a lot in you may have to leave a lot out. So long as it is
no more than a stray detail or two, you're doing well. But with raw material as
untidy as constitutional law, details tend to fall like trimmings in a garment
shop. There isn't much in the way of really grand theory because whatever
there is-or has been--costs, in this sense, so dearly. More or less everything
is left out; it is all hole, as the politicians now say, and no doughnut.
Along comes Ely, then, with the bargain of the century. I can give you
40-odd years of constitutional law, he says, in one package. It's called (I know
the tag is cumbrous) representation-reinforcement.' We'll call it (even the top
salesman can use some help) the theory of fair process, understanding by that
elections as well as other processes of government. 2 It makes sense of all the
major cases in criminal procedure, voter representation, and race discrimina-
tion. And what is more, it allows us to build from these towards appealing
results in sex discrimination and even homosexual rights. The cost? Simple
and, to Ely, trivial: doing without privacy.
This essay is a reflection on that prospect.
I. INTERPRETIVE EMBARRASSMENT
Had it ended with Griswold v. Connecticut,3 in 1965, the right to privacy
might have gone largely without criticism. Connecticut's birth control statute
was even then a matter of no great moment. True, other states had similar
statutes, but these went mostly unenforced, and had it not been for the con-
currence of general legislative prudery and particular religious doctrine, no
one of any consequence would have given a hoot.4 The right itself is hard to
define, but taking it at its result-a right in married people to use contracep-
tives with impunity-it hardly shakes the foundations of the Republic.5
But of course it did not end there. An old Greek proverb has it that the
adulterer and thief always win in the end because they are always more
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
I. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY].
2. Id. at 73-134.
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. As it was, the wave of criticism took time to mount. But since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it has
become more and more imposing. See, e.g., Posner. The Uncertain Protection of Privacy By the Supreme
Court. 1979 SUP. Cr. REV. 173.
5. Nor do abortion rights, of course. But the contrast between these two privacy decisions could hardly be
more dramatic than in the political reactions to them.
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patient-and, we might add, more avid. So it was, some will say, with sex and
the Constitution; one way or another privacy would win out over old-time
virtue. Thus even the Court was embarrassed, not long after Griswold, when
confronted with a case that seemed to raise the question of sex and the single
girl. The embarrassment in Eisenstadt v. Baird6 was doctrinal, of course, not
sexual. But it was severe enough to prompt the majority of Justices into a
relentless (and somewhat empty) equal protection analysis that would nearly
avoid privacy altogether; the majority opinion in Eisenstadt, though written
by Justice Brennan, and despite its if-privacy-means-anything rhetoric, says
nothing at all about the extent of the Grisw'old right. If such a right exists, then
equal protection requires an even hand. Yes, but does it exist? And if it does,
does it invalidate restrictions on distribution? Eisenstadt does not say. The
case is decided, as it was argued, in the alternative.
The Eisenstadt embarrassment characterizes privacy adjudication from
beginning to end. As early as Skinner v. Oklahoma,7 Justice Douglas pre-
ferred a flourish of rhetoric on the underlying issue-can the state sterilize
felons?-to a decision on that basis.8 Careful equal protection analysis yielded
little justification for Oklahoma's practice of sterilizing in some categories of
multiple conviction but not others: three-time chicken thieves but not three-
time bank embezzlers. So the imperative of judicial economy alone, if taken
seriously enough, required some such purely equal protection decision. The
result after all is enough for the felons, who escape sterilization, but not
too much for Oklahoma, which retained, in Justice Jackson's classic phrase of
more or less the same period, the ability to "deal with the subject at hand." 9
Why use more constitutional power than is needed? Oklahoma may either
sterilize all of its felons or none of them, the Supreme Court says. And that is
all it says.
By the time of the Welfare Abortion Cases, however, such judicial
economies begin to look less penny-wise than pound-foolish. Do we or don't
we have a privacy right and what is its reach?
The decisions say that we do, that much is plain from Griswold,'0 from
Roe," from Whalen, 12 from Moore.13 But an obvious unease haunts these
decisions. They seem to suffer from either too much concreteness-piling up
bits and pieces of text into jerrybuilt concepts-or too little. Of late it is rather
less than more; the recent opinions tend to resolve constitutional questions in
summary abstractions, "broad enough to encompass" the particular right at
stake. 4 What hampers these efforts in constitutional decisionmaking is an
6. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
7. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
8. Id. at 541.
9. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson. J., concurring).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1%5).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
13. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
14. See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 153 (1973).
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interpretive embarrassment. There is still no better place to examine it than in
the Douglas opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion begins with a commonplace of what we
may call, with irony but not without respect, the "class of '37": "Overtones
of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York ... should be our
guide. But we decline that invitation .... ,,"' Why? Well, of course, because
"[w]e do not sit as a super-legislature . . . ." "This law, however," Douglas
writes in the next sentence, "operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife. . . ." That "however" functions, if you will, as the blush
to the interpretive embarrassment itself. What Lochner did, according to
Douglas, was to legislate-to freely "determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws"-in certain areas: economics, business, "social condi-
tions" generally. But Griswold, as his "however" suggests, presents another
"area" altogether. The sexual intimacies of marriage, however much they
partake of "social conditions" (or even economics), are simply not in the
same category or even on the same scale as the manufacturing and marketing
failures that prompted, say, the National Industrial Recovery Act.16 Yet there
is enough to the analogy between Griswold and Lochner to cause embarrass-
ment.
It is, like all embarrassment, rooted in the unwilling or unwitting violation
of an important convention. Here the convention is simply that there must be
a text for any assertion of the power ofjudicial review. Going without a text is
like going naked. While some bold souls can happily defy such a convention-
"there's more enterprise in walking naked" wrote Yeats' 7-judges for the
most part (and thank Heaven) cannot. To say that the king has no clothes,
after all, is not to say that he is no longer king; but to say that the judge has no
text is to say he has no authority at all. Writtenness plays a central part in our
constitutional tradition. A judge without a text is not only streaking, if you
will, he is usurping.
Now Douglas, whose reputation suffers from both too much praise and
too little,' 8 deserves at least as much credit as his academic critics for his
acute sense of the interpretive embarrassment. And so he begins his affirma-
tive argument in Griswold with "things not mentioned":
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill
of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether
public or private or parochial-is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any
particular subject or any foreign language. 19
These are examples, of course, but their number can easily be expanded, as
15. Id. at 482.
16. National Industrial Recovery Act. ch. 90 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
17. YEATS. A Coat, in COLLECTED POEMS 125 (8th printing 1962).
18. Compare Countryman. Justice Douglas and Freedom of -rpression, U. ILL. L.F. 301 (1978), with
Dworkin. Dissent on Douglas, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, February 19. 1981, at 3.
19. See Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1%5).
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both Thomas Grey and Jesse Choper have recently shown.20 The Douglas
point is obvious but no longer trivial: in the great body of settled constitu-
tional precedent some important rights appear-whether to appointed counsel
or integrated schooling-which are not "mentioned' 21 in the body of the
Constitution or its amendments. Call this the first Douglas proposition, then,
and simplify it: there are unstated constitutional rights.
Here we meet the first blush of the interpretive embarrassment, but it is
no more than a blush, for at this point the text itself is embarrassing. The ninth
amendment, as Ely has argued so well,'2 amply clothes this first Douglas
proposition. Still the proposition comes to something almost entirely nega-
tive. It does not (and cannot) establish which unstated rights belong in consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Some do, no doubt, but which?
The cases Douglas cites suggest no answer here, unless we take it from
his citation that he favors those unstated rights closely allied either with
freedom of expression-the most fundamental political right-or freedom in
child-rearing-arguably the most fundamental personal right.23 In part, then,
Douglas makes out the contrast with Lochner in terms of the subjects of
invalidated regulation rather than the technique of invalidating interpretation.
Is this the whole burden of the very self-conscious distinction he makes
between his own effort in Griswold and Lochner? Critics have said as much
but they are pretty plainly wrong.24
Douglas suggests a second proposition that is actually quite rigorous (and
surprisingly conservative) in its plausible applications. He spoke, of course,
in dense, almost astrological obscurity, of penumbras and emanations:
"[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.''
-
The simple point he would make to his critics on and off the Court is that
"without ... peripheral rights ... specific rights would be less secure."
This puts it weakly as well as obscurely. To strengthen "specific" rights, an
indefinite if not infinite number of "penumbral" rights might be invented.
How are we to settle on those that belong, as it were, to the unblushing
Constitution?
The answer lies, I think, in Douglas' use of one of the great freedom of
association cases, NAACP v. Alabama.6 When the claim was first made that
Alabama sought membership lists, under its general statute for the regulation
of out-of-state corporations,27 in order to suppress the NAACP, it met two
20. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 70-79 (1980); Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716-17 (1975).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
22. ELY, supra note I. at 34-38.
23. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535. 541 (1942).
24. See. e.g., Bork. Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problens, 47 ND. L.J. 1.7-11(1971).
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
27. Id. at 451.
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sharp rejoinders: first, that Alabama had indeed provided equal protection (or
regulation) to the NAACP, since all such incorporated private associations
were required to file membership lists; and, second, that Alabama had not
passed a law "abridging the freedom of speech," since the NAACP's discus-
sions or opinions, before or after filing, were no part of the regulation in
question. In fact, of course, knowledge of Alabama's motivation would have
given force to either charge. But motivation may be well hidden, and in this
case was.2
8
The notion of association bridges both the equal protection claim and the
free speech claims. Certain people are being picked out for abuse but also
certain ideas. A conceptual bridge between two valid constitutional doctrines
is not itself necessarily a valid constitutional doctrine: I might very well bridge
liberty and equality, for instance, with Rawlsian principles of protecting the
neediest, without thereby making out a persuasive principle for welfare rights
adjudication.2 9 To the extent (and I suspect it is large) that Douglas had some
simple bridging technique in mind for privacy-as the bridge between various
amendments, say-he must be wrong as a matter of technique. It proves too
much; it proves even Lochner."
But the second Douglas proposition can be made into much more than a
simple bridge. The Alabama decision in fact rested on the necessity of confi-
dentiality of membership for the continuance of the activities of the local
NAACP. True, other, equally regulated private associations would have
flourished in spite of the regulation. You cannot gainsay its formal equality.
But informally, if you will, the NAACP would have lost most of its members.
Few white Alabaman employers wanted black people with "uppity ideas,"
never mind an uppity organization to implement them. These ideas them-
selves, moreover, were hardly entertainable in the Alabama of the 1950s
without some such confidential forum as the NAACP in which people could
nurture and develop them-as well perhaps as put them into practice. It is
true that the overbreadth doctrine, invalidating regulatory "means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly," probably suffices as constitutional doctrine
here. But the point of that doctrine, as Harlan articulated it in another notori-
ous Alabama case, is that such regulations "invade the area of protected
freedoms."- 31 And it is not simply to bridge the race and speech problems of
the NAACP to suggest that the confidential association of members is itself
protected by the Constitution. In cases such as this, if you do not protect the
associational activity you will lose all effective protection for the expressive
activities. So understood, the second Douglas proposition is that among the
unstated rights in the Constitution must be those that are necessary for the
exercise of those that are stated.
28. Id. at 465.
29. J. RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 151-52, 250 (1971).
30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. NAACP v. Alabama ex" rel. Flowers. 377 U.S. 288. 370 (1963).
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If we begin with speech, then, we may say that to prevent, say, a despotic
majority from allowing us our free speech only in insulated speech boxes or
on isolated promontories (or, in Alabama, in absolutely exposed ones), we
must have free association as well. And given such a freedom of association,
in Alabama in the late 1950s, we must have some protection from its effective
repression even by general and "rational" regulation in breach of confiden-
tiality.
There are, however, three caveats to this interpretive technique. First,
we must take care with the concept of necessity itself. Unless we can specify
a legal or constitutional necessity as opposed to a material one-such as food
or shelter-we will have a notion too big for our interpretive breeches. 2
"Necessity" in the broadest sense is in fact much less narrow a concept than
that of the conjunction or bridging of two rights. If I cannot speak freely
unless I can eat freely too, then I have shown a "necessity" that a right to free
food comes along with a right to free speech, and so with free housing and free
schooling. How then are we to narrow this notion of necessity? The answer is
obvious, but tricky. The necessity at issue is negative; it is simply a require-
ment that the government not take away with the left hand what it has given
with the right. Alabama, after all, had a suspect motive in what it required of
the NAACP. Or did it? The state claimed in its argument and briefs that
"whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of [NAACP's]
members may have upon participation by Alabama citizens in petitioner activ-
ities follows not from state action but from private community pressures."-
33
Shift your suspicion, in other words, to those who abuse the public record.
But this is not to say that we have to shift it away from those who make that
record. The state is an agent in all this, an indispensable one. "[I]t is only after
the initial exertion of state power," wrote Harlan, "that private action.takes
hold." 3 4 The right to privacy in association runs against the state's actions-
the only legitimately coercive actions here-and not against the actions
of its private citizens. Thus, a constitutional "necessity" is one of noninter-
ference only on the part of the state. This is not to lay to rest the real difficul-
ties of the concept. Counter-examples come quickly to mind; what are we to
say, for instance, of "necessity" in the divorce fees cases or the welfare
residency cases? The point is that a core concept is available here and that, by
and large, it works.
Second, however, comes the difficulty of distinguishing the degrees of
necessity, in particular the difference between an unstated right that is helpful
(or even needful) in the exercise of a stated right and an unstated right that is
really necessary. Douglas wrote of "penumbras ... that help give [the stated
rights] life and substance., 35 There is only one way around this. We cannot
32. See Michelman. On Protecting the Poor Throgugh the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.
(1969).
33. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
34. Id.
35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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play Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.36 The necessity at
issue has to be real. In this at least we want strict construction; otherwise we
will have no fixed principles at all. Is the unstated right in question one
without which the stated right will go unexercised and unexercisable?
Evidence to answer this question will vary in kind and quality. In the Alabama
case, as in many of the race cases following Brown, the Court seems to have
taken a sort of informal notice of prejudice in the state's legislative and execu-
tive chambers. Rhetoric in Douglas' Griswold opinion-"Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives?" 37-notices the likely but unproven and un-
evinced consequences of enforcement of statutes like Connecticut's.
The Alabama case (and perhaps Griswold too) is one in which an agency
of state government burdens given rights to free speech by general statutes
and procedures more or less unexceptionable at a certain level of abstraction.
Obviously, Alabama can ask for detailed information about foreign corpora-
tions within its borders (and Connecticut can search bedrooms to enforce its
criminal legislation). What the Court's "notice" does, however, is to force
the argument onto different levels of abstraction from those preferred by the
state in its defense of regulation. These levels are both higher-what is the
overall purpose and meaning of the first amendment?-and lower-what
becomes of the NAACP in Alabama in 1958 when it hands in its membership
lists? At whatever level the analysis occurs, the judgment of constitutional
"necessity" remains disputable. This leads me to a third caution about the
Douglas technique in Griswold.
To the extent that a majority of Justices see a constitutional necessity in
the guarantee of an unstated right, they may seem to have their own way with
the Bill of Rights. Or so thought Justice Black:
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaran-
teed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guaran-
tee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in
meaning.
38
Privacy, as Black then pointed out, is the perfect vehicle for such expansion
and contraction. The real issue, he argued, is not constitutional necessity but
constitutional substitution--"the use of the term 'right of privacy' as a
comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
.unreasonable searches and seizures.' - 39
Putting it this way begs some of the questions. If privacy merely substi-
tutes for something else, then we are kidding ourselves when we get from
privacy something over and above what we get from, say, the search and
36. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
37. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479. 485 (1965).
38. Id. at 509 (Black. J.. dissenting).
39. Id.
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seizure clause. But this perplexity boomerangs: would Black really suggest,
after joining the Alabama decision, that "association" simply stands in for
"speech"? If not, it is hard to know what he means when he says in Griswold
that "First Amendment freedoms ... have suffered from a failure of the
courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment... instead of
invoking multitudes of words for those the Framers used." 40
Ely and others among us recently have found themselves less begrudging
in recalling Justice Black "as the quintessential interpretivist. - 4' Thomas
Grey, who coined that phrase, writes more warily of "the great power and
compelling simplicity" of Black's view of constitutional adjudication. True
enough. But Justice Black, for all his power and charm, was still dead wrong
to think that "sticking to the simple language" of the Constitution was enough
for him-or for any other Justice, judge, or lawyer. By this conceit, Black had
it that words do the work of ideas-or better the work of judges. His incon-
sistency in this was no less patent than frequent; witness the idea of freedom
of association itself.
Over against this, the restated Douglas rule addresses ideas and not
words (except insofar-and I suppose it is most or all of the way-as words
are and are understood to be the carriers of ideas). Black's quarrel is not with
the substitution of words but the substitution of ideas-or, more precisely,
with the implication and extension of one idea in another. But unless he would
have no such implications and extensions at all, the proposition is absurdly
antithought. We will not get anywhere with constitutional interpretation
unless we begin with the freedom to think about what it means; is freedom of
association somehow implied by freedom of speech? Whatever else it is,
Douglas' rule of necessity is a technique for disciplining thought and interpre-
tation, for confining it within a range of ideas, and for making sure that the
original ideas are put into modem practice.
All this is something of a prologue, however, to the actual argument in
the Douglas opinion. But what follows is immensely dissappointing. Why and
where is privacy a "necessary" part of the constitutional scheme? Here
Douglas'-and everyone's-real trouble with privacy begins. "Various
42guarantees create zones of privacy," he wrote, in one sentence that even
Black might concede. But then came what Grey has called the "shuffle":
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of the ight to privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"fight of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which govern-
ment may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
40. Id.
41. ELY. supra note 1, at 2.
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 484 (1965).
43. Id.
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To this Douglas adds, incongruously, the ninth amendment, which, whatever
else you may say, most emphatically does not "create a zone of privacy." But
do the other amendments? Yes and no.
If we mean by "zone of privacy," a figurative or literal place into which
the government should not intrude without substantial justification, then the
amendments cited suggest at least two: first, the literal place that is a private
house-together perhaps with the persons, papers, and effects within it; and
second, the more figurative place that is the mind in its convictions and
impressions."4 These "zones," however, are of quite disparate kinds. The
first amendment does seem both to afford and to require, as a student note
argued several years ago,45 an ancillary set of protections for the privacy or
confidentiality of thought as well as discussion. The NAACP case plainly
protects that discussion for which association is only the occasion. And, on a
strict account, freedom of thought is necessary to freedom of discussion. This
applies the Douglas rule in an attenuated but not entirely hypothetical fashion;
Stanley v. Georgia46 is just such a case. But Stanley was at once a trouble-
some case-involving concededly obscene materials kept at home-and one
whose outcome might well have varied without Griswold's "fight to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy." 47 Barring the technology of 1984, privacy of thought
remains a sort of natural condition. We don't know and can't know, without
some voluntary or involuntary sign, what anyone else is thinking. True, the
fifth amendment will not allow the government even to try to find out by force
what crimes are on your mind. But the relation between the very specific fifth
amendment "privacy of thought" and the very general first amendment
guarantee of this concept is precisely the problem.
At first glance, anyway, these very disparate ideas seem yoked by any-
thing but a "necessity," whether logical or not. Thus it seems easy enough to
imagine the one without the other; or does it?
You can certainly conceive of a constitutional regime that coerces con-
fessions but not thought more generally-or, to put it the other way, coerces
thought generally but not confessions in particular. But how fanciful is this
conception? Logicians argue over possible worlds and this is one. But lawyers
argue over the one practical world in which we live, and here the relation
between the foreground right against self-incrimination and the background
fight against coercive self-revelation, is close, very close. Necessity is not too
strong a word for the practical and political connection between them. In fact,
it takes a rather hardy positivism-such as Justice Black's-to deny it. You
can have one without the other, of course; meaning, you can conceive of it.
But no constitutional system that respects the one can scorn the other. To do
44. Note. Roe and Paris: Does Privacy' Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
45. Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973).
46. 394 U.S. 557 (1%9).
47. Id. at 564.
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so would be to jeopardize the practice in question by taking away either its
foreground application or its background context. The problem is not the
mutual and reciprocal "necessity" of these two rights. It is the question what
else that necessity implies. Between freedom of thought and freedom from
coerced confession lie any number of possible freedoms. The fallacy of the
"bridging" technique is nowhere more obvious; perhaps it is the right to
rebellion (which Justice Douglas flirted with) which links them. How, in any
case, is privacy-in the requisite sense of a freedom in the consensual
intimacies at least of marriage-to prove itself the constitutionally favored
relation or concept? Here Douglas' ingenious handiwork breaks down alto-
gether. Only the rhapsody on marriage-"a coming together for better or
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred ' ---
saves an opinion whose concepts fall suddenly in a heap. "As well him as
another," Molly Bloom said of her sporadic companion in "coming
together.-49 As well privacy, you may say, as any other right; as well
Griswold as Lochner.
II. EQUALITY'S GAP
Ely writes at the end of his book of a law prohibiting the removal of gall
bladders. 50 He lustily engages one or two of his past critics in a sober fools'
dialogue on its constitutionality. At bottom, the contest is between improba-
bility and absurdity. For Ely, to paraphrase Justice Black, would like to rid
himself of his gall blader-presuming it is ailing-as soon as the next person;
to him the hypothetical law is fully as ridiculous as Connecticut's birth control
statute was to the most emphatically dissenting Justice in Griswold. But it is
also a wildly improbable piece of legislation:
"I don't think that law is unconstitutional. Curtains for my
theory? ... Well, no, since that law couldn't conceivably pass."
"But suppose it did."
"Come on, it wouldn't. We've got problems enough without hypothesizing
absurdities." 
51
So the question Ely puts is, why fight it? Why fight over milk that no one
threatens to spill? This is Ely's only example, throughout the book, of a
privacy right explicitly without constitutional remedy. He writes dispar-
agingly of contraception, of course, and so presumably, a law against that-
scarcely an improbability before Griswold v. Connecticut-would be upheld
despite absurdity under Ely's jurisprudence. On abortion, moreover, we
already know his views, and in some detail5 2 But Ely strongly implies-as in
48. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
49. J. JOYCE, ULYSSES 768 (1946).
50. ELY, supra note I, at 182.
51. Id.
52. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wotf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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the case of homosexuals-that the compass of his vigorous equal protection
includes all that was of significance in privacy.
We are left without constitutional protection for our gall bladders, our
abortions, our contraceptives. Subtracting for improbability, is this such a
loss?
From whichever side of the controversy, privacy as a right-to-abort is of
the utmost significance. However, that significance is qualified both by the
political and, if you will, the interpretive economies involved. Alaska,
Hawaii, New York, and Washington all permitted abortions at the time of the
Roe decision. 3 The other states did not; but the political struggle had really
just begun. It is a fair speculation that California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and
others would have quickly followed suit. There would, of course, have been
terrific political controversy and resistance; France and Italy (which are in
fact not much less Catholic than Pennsylvania or Connecticut) show the
pattern.54 The results would have varied from state to state and region to
region. Still both controversy and variation are in themselves more than
acceptable in a federal democracy. And to the cry of "choice now," the
interpretive economy can respond only with what it has available. In the case
of abortion this was very little.
Thus contraceptives and gall bladders. Although Ely does not deliver on
Pierce55 and Meyer,56 not to mention Zablocki 7 and Moore,58 it is clear all
along that privacy is not taken as an indispensable ground in those decisions.
For what decisions then do we need privacy?
Consider, for instance, a law to limit-by a tax penalty, say-the number
of children born to any given family in a state or the nation. 9 This is no
Holocaust, nor even necessarily Eugenics with a fearsome capital E. It is
population policy. And given sufficient crowding and scarcity, it could be
very good population policy at that. Is it also unconstitutional?
An equal protection analysis might well avail. Presumably few of the
legislators shared (or expected to share) in the condition against which they
legislated. To that extent, a suspicion might arise of a thoughtless or even
invidious burden cast on those without sufficient strength in the legislature to
resist its imposition. On the other hand, literal thoughtlessness-such that the
legislature had no reason for its legislation-does not obtain here.
The absurdity of the near-universal prohibition on gall bladder removal is
literal; it makes no sense whatsoever. At the same time its improbability gives
us a set-off against its absurdity. It simply is not something we have to fear.
But a law on compulsory birth control is anything but absurd. It makes quite
53. Burt, The Constitution of the Fanily. 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 372.
54. For discussion of France's abortion controversy, see New York Times, April 5, 1971 at 28, col. 2. For
Italian furor over contraception, see New York Times, May 13, 1969 at 9, col. I and Mar. 17, 1971 at 3, col. 3.
55. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
56. Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
57. Zablocki v. Redhail. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
58. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
59. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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good sense. And (more or less as a consequence) it is not half so improbable.
Indeed, the world's largest democracy tried it within the last decade. 60 So let
us assume its passage into law by rational legislators who see it as necessary,
wise, or at least politic.
If this legislature, like most (but unlike Ely's), has its reasons, are they
somehow suspect? In equal protection analysis that can only mean suspect as
prejudiced against a group, however the group is defined. Race sets the
pattern. In every case of legislation or governance in which race has a part,
the government must in effect rebut a presumption of prejudice-not simply
by way of reasons but of necessities of policy. It must remove any doubt that
the legislation had to pass in this form.
Some, like Mr. Justice Rehnquist, would stop there, with race and its
cognates exhausting judicial suspicion. 6' But most of us, with Ely, remain at
least somewhat suspicious of other classifications as well. Gender and legiti-
macy are two that the Court acknowledges in practice; poverty and homo-
sexuality two more that it does not.62
Now Ely would be generous in his equal protection sympathies and so in
his equal protection suspicions. But, as he acknowledges, generosity comes
easier than generalization. From race we have derived a suggestive but incon-
clusive set of the symptoms of prejudice. Thus, race is said to be visible (like
height) and immutable (like genes). The suggestion is that race is an obvious
natural condition. Suspicion follows nature (at least when nature is obvious).
This works for gender but not for illegitimacy or "alienage," both of which
are strictly legal conditions. It is also said of race, and much more truly, that it
is an irrational stereotype.63
All of this seeks a legal key to the social lock of prejudice. It would be
easier if the key were always biological or even statistical. But it cannot be.
The inescapability of race-which is what we point to when we talk of its
"visibility" or "immutability"-is not a natural but a social condition. And it
is of a piece with its irrationality and unfairness as a category of distinction in
American life.
Ely's great contribution is in the elaboration of a specifically political
theory of prejudice. "The whole point of the approach is to identify those
groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no
apparent interest in attending." 64 Even this Carolene Products sort of analy-
sis remains indeterminate, however. The premise is that majorities can fend
for themselves at election time. But what then of women, who have had an
electoral but not a representative majority for much of this century? In the
end, suspicion can be no less searching than prejudice itself: gross, chronic,
60. New York Times. Jan. 2. 1976 at 2. col. 4.
61. Trimble v. Gordon. 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting).
62. ELY. supra note I. at 162-64.
63. Id. at 156.
64. Id. at 151.
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hurtful prejudice poisons the well of majoritarian democracy. Then, says Ely,
only then should courts intervene.
So here I put the case of families with more than two children. Is that
suspicious? It depends again on what you mean. Like race, in one sense, the
trait "fits" the mischief; these are precisely the human reproductive units-to
put it in science fiction talk-without which no overpopulation would occur
(barring more science fiction horrors). And many people, including most
legislators in the jurisdiction, have taken a dislike to them. (One hears snide
reference to rabbits and so on.) So there is literal prejudice. But people do not
much cater to the carriers of disease either. Is it justified, this (pre-)judgment?
It is surely an arguable, even reasonable, basis for legislating. Is it then
suspect? If by that we mean, is it an example of a chronic and irrational
stereotype, premised on an irrelevant but inescapable condition, and in long
and frequent use as a device of oppression, the answer is no. The condition is
visible, and even natural, but it is also highly (if newly) relevant to the impor-
tant policy goal of preventing overpopulation. And while the burdened group
is by definition a minority in the legislature, it is not a minority particularly
needful or deserving-as a minority-of special judicial solicitude.
Under privacy precedents-or, if you will, "family" or "sexuality"
precedents-there is a remedy, of course, and a potent one: the right asserted
is fundamental and no less secure than the immunity to racial classification.
But many or most of these privacy decisions are susceptible to equal protec-
tion analysis, on the model of Skinner v. Oklahoma.65 In Pierce66 and Meyer,67
religious and ethnic minorities were subjected to legislation that, although
general in terms, was quite specific-and concededly so-in its burden on
them.68 In Zablocki v. Redhail a poverty classification arguably obtained.
Again the question is, do we need privacy?
We have a good instance of what I see as its constitutional necessity in
the recent case of Moore v. East Cleveland.69 East Cleveland sought to regu-
late occupancy of so called units of housing by units, if you will, of legal and
blood relationship. Mrs. Moore's two grandchildren were cousins rather than
brothers and so fell-barely-outside the range of permissible relationships
for "single family occupancy." To justify such legislation, East Cleveland
had to do little more than cite zoning precedents together with its interest in
adequate housing for its residents. Overcrowding, in particular, makes out an
ostensibly valid state interest of some importance, and has been successfully
employed for breaking up or preventing "family" units of certain kinds.
70
Granting this, however, the application of the rule to Mrs. Moore and her
65. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
66. Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
67. Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
68. See Justice McReynold's discussion of possible inequality in id. at 398. See also Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
69. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
70. Id. at 515-16.
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grandchildren surely flirts with absurdity. A sizeable lot surrounded the
several-room house in which she lived with her two grandchildren and one of
her sons. Would East Cleveland's City Council be trying by sheer force of
legislation to turn itself into Lake Forest or Beverly Hills?
7
'
This comes close to absurdity, but perhaps not close enough. In Belle
Terre v. Boraas,72 a group of four or five students were evicted from a rented
single-family house in Long Island. "No big deal," we may say, identifying all
too easily with these casual undergraduate nomads. All of them, no doubt,
went on to pass their exams and take jobs that might well land them once
again-only this time legally, with wife or husband and two kids in tow-in
one Belle Terre or another. They had no constitutional recourse. The purpose
of Belle Terre's regulation amply justified eviction for the majority of the
Court.73 Yet the numbers cannot have made the difference. What did?
Now equal protection without privacy is still a powerful tool of fair
constitutional treatment. And even when no suspect categories apply, the
requirements of "fit" between legislative purpose and legislative tag can
smooth off the jagged edges of legislatively sanctioned coercion-even in
housing. 74 It may be that East Cleveland's application of a residential zoning
ordinance to Mrs. Moore falls even under this scrutiny. But how?
The seemingly obvious answer lies in the very detail of the restrictions
imposed. For East Cleveland, only certain lines and degrees of relation,
whether by blood or law, will satisfy zoning requirements. Grandchildren, in
particular, must all be in the same line in order to live with their grandparents.
Thus, two sets of grandchildren-even two sets with only one child in each, as
with the Moores-cannot live together under one roof. At the very least, line-
drawing of such nicety has about it the feel of arbitrariness. Thus Ira Lupu
writes:
In Moore ... the "family" definition in the ordinance seemed perfect for invali-
dation as an arbitrary classification: the limitation of permitted resident grand-
children to those in one and only one descendant line is rather remote from a
concern to protect the character of a single-family neighborhood. 75
But just what are the ingredients of the suggested "remoteness" and "arbi-
trariness" here? East Cleveland can hardly deny that there is no inherent
necessity in the particular distinction drawn. They might just as well have let
cousins live together, but not, let us say, second cousins. Or if that leaves
something to be desired in the way of reducing density, they might have let no
grandchildren reside with their grandparents-as is said to be the case in
certain retirement communities in the Southwest. An outright ban on grand-
71. Burt. The Constitution ofthe Family. 1979 SUP. Cr. REV. 329, 390.
72. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974).
73. Id. at 8-10.
74. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949)
75. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Anendinent, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981. 1017 (1979).
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children, says Lupu,76 would at least leave the city "on safer equal protection
ground."
Perhaps, but the prior question is, what exactly constitutes safe and
unsafe "equal protection ground"? What standard of equality applies to the
definition, for zoning purposes, of families or family units?
This is an important question because its answer gives the measure of
what I will call the equality gap: the cluster of privacy (or better, liberty)
rights lost to us-even for argument's sake-by a pure equal protection
theory of individual rights. Lupu's suggestion is that Moore's interest lies in
its choice of rationales: "it was the first decision since the 1937 revolution to
invalidate a statute on naked substantive due process grounds when equal
protection grounds seemed readily available."'n If so, the equality gap is slim
indeed, spanning Griswold and Roe and very little else. To that extent, doing
without privacy comes perhaps to a small sacrifice (although scarcely a
negligible one). But Lupu is surely mistaken in his analysis.
There has been much water over the equal protection dam since the
1940s, and much of it murky. The dichotomy between strict and lax scrutiny
has given way before the extension-and an almost inevitable extension it
now seems-of some degree of "suspicion" to sex and other classifications
once taken for granted as innocent legislative line-drawing corresponding to
the real world of human differences. Nonetheless, and despite occasional
obfuscation,7 the dichotomy survives between the run of cases tested by
rationality-the bare form of equality-and those tested by suspicion. Ely's
own elaboration of suspicion, by way of majority motivation and minority
vulnerability, rests squarely on this distinction between suspicion and ration-
ality.79 And while he extends to homosexuals and others a scrutiny the Court
refuses, Ely scrupulously maintains the economy of suspicion under which
the Court has reviewed equal protection claims since Korematsu8s or even the
Slaughterhouse Cases.8' Moreover, this economy is a practical necessity.
Only a very few legislative distinctions can be tested with anything like the
rigors needed to protect racial minorities. If every distinction is so tested, we
will have much more government by judiciary-or at least review by judi-
ciary-than we can take. After all, the Lochner Court made as good a use of
equality as of liberty itself.
82Now whatever you may say of its "arbitrariness," in the strict sense,the regulation in Moore is not irrationally arbitrary; it is not senseless. East
76. Id. at 1017.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. E.g.. Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
79. ELY, supra note 1, at 145.
80. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
81. 83 U.S. (16 wall.) 36 (1873).
82. That is. -'fixed or arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance .. decisive but unreasoned.
WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY 138 (2d ed. 1936).
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Cleveland seeks to maintain the single-family character of its neighborhoods.
To prohibit boarding houses, fraternities, and occupancy by unrelated groups
of three or more, as in Belle Terre, is felt to be insufficient. Other forms of
"crowding" are also objectionable to the majority on the City Council. Multi-
family occupancy, in particular, even by relatives, that is, brothers, sisters, or
what have you, with children of their own, could be precisely what the city
Fathers (and Mothers) don't want. So the question arises in the Council's
deliberations: how can we take another step against Tobacco Road without
defeating our own purposes? Obviously, the majority is not about to ban
single-family occupancy itself (which has become at this point something of
an obsession). To prohibit "families" of grandparents and grandchildren
would seem much too harsh. But then again to prohibit such families in more
than one line of descent might work. It would exempt most of the hardship
cases-where, say, the grandchildren had only their grandparents for
guardians-while still achieving the city's objective. This way the Council
distinguishes the cases of a Mrs. Moriarty living with her bachelor sons and a
Mrs. McCarty living with her married sons and their families. But it fails to
distinguish, you may say, Mrs. McCarty from Mrs. Moore.
That is true, and that is the trouble. The legislative failure to distinguish
here works what will seem to most of us a hardship, and even an injustice. Is it
for all that an arbitrary failure? Once the legislation is shown, as here, to bear
"a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective," 83 its arbitrari-
ness-in the requisite sense of irrationality or capriciousness-can no longer
really be at issue. "Every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that
might well have been included." 84 The only recourse, then, is to argue that to
leave out any blood relations in defining a family is arbitrary and irrational,
however well it advances valid legislative purposes. But this requires either
that we allow some special independent value to such relations-which surely
is not a judgment of equality-or that we disallow all legislative use of blood-
lines as suspicious-which is a judgment of equality, alright, but of a much
different order.85
Had the fourteenth amendment been drafted for the dissolution of a
feudal society (in which rights and privileges were tied to kinship) as opposed
to a caste society (in which they were tied to race), it might well have made
blood as suspect as race. But this was not the case. Our history counsels
infinitely more caution about race than about kinship. In the Louisiana pilots
case' even outright state nepotism withstood equal protection scrutiny of a
relatively modern vintage.87 But East Cleveland's legislation is nowhere near
so focused or so suspect. Nothing in the record suggests any motivation
83. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 538 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. A judgment, that is, of -strict scrutiny." ELY, supra note 1. at 148.
86. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
87. Id. at 556.
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besides the obvious (if priggish) one of "zoning for good neighborhoods."
Mrs. Moore's particular situation, moreover, is neither fixed nor stereo-
typed.88 The Council in all likelihood never even thought of hard cases like
hers-until, that is, an overzealous neighbor or inspector complained. And
even at that point, as the Chief Justice had it in dissent, administrative discre-
tion under the usual waiver and variance proceedings might have saved the
day for the Moores.89 But what could not save them, on any analysis short of
suspicion, was the equal protection of the laws as we now know it.
III. LOCHNER AND LIBERTY
If equality cannot do the job, why not liberty? The answer is in a sense
quite simple. Liberty has become-has remained-an enormous interpretive
embarrassment in constitutional law. The embarrassment is itself ambiguous;
the lack of a text, by itself, cannot explain much. As Ely notes, there is really
plenty of text available, beginning with the ninth amendment and concluding
with the fourteenth; and even without a text, there is always room for an
argument of constitutional necessity or implication-this much Douglas,
along with time and the river of precedent, established once and for all. Nor is
the lack of a principle the heart of the matter. There are principles galore here,
and, since Mill, they can be as finely parsed as any in constitutiopal jurispru-
dence. 9° The real difficulty comes with the attempts to connect text and prin-
ciple.
"A neutral principle may be a thing of beauty and ajoy forever," writes
Ely, '[b]ut if it lacks connection with anything the text has marked as special
then it is not a constitutional principle . . . ."9' But what exactly is to count as
a connection? Ely's own "fair process" concept has the merits of a batch of
articles and amendments suggesting a continuing and primary commitment to
representative democracy. The content of that commitment can be seen,
however, as either terribly uncertain or treacherously theoretical. (How else
is Macaulay's "virtual" representation made to do such worthy service?92)
And that is precisely the trouble with connections; they come in all sizes and
qualities--close, loose, obvious, subtle, weak, strong. Almost all asserted
connections are disputable; they are, as the philosophers have it, essentially
contested (or contestable) concepts.9 They are theories, in short, writ large or
small.
Why not, then, a theory of liberty? For a thousand reasons, all of which
come to one: Lochner.
The threshold argument that gathers round Lochner goes like this. First,
88. Burt. The Constitution, oj the Fanil. 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 390.
89. Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494. 521 (1976) (Burger, C. J.. dissenting).
90. See, e.g.. the recent effort in Karst. The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
91. Ely. The Wages of Crying Wolji A Comnent on Roe v. Wade. 82 YALE L.J. 1920, 949 (1979).
92. See ELY. sttpra note I. at 82-83.
93. Gallic. Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARIST. SOC. 167 (1965).
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Lochner is a decision without fair connection to the text (and thereby to the
consent in majority will that the text embodies). Second, Lochner is a liberty
decision, the representative liberty decision. And third, liberty has no fair
connection to the text. This puts it crudely. There is a more refined or genteel
version of the argument, sounding in prudence rather than logic. Still the
crude version is met more often than one might think-even in Ely himself.
94
As a logical matter Lochner can stand for nothing so emphatic. The premises
may be true but the deduction is false. The crude version is at bottom an
induction from one instance-or a very few. That the Lochner decision lacked
connection to the text gives us no basis to assume that all kindred decisions
must suffer the same defect.
The genteel version of the argument invokes these premises to deduce
the proposition not that liberty adjudication lacks a fair connection to the text
but that it runs a very high risk of such a lack. So put, we have a proposition
about Lochner that comes very close to the truth. Along with the other cases
in its "line," Lochner suggests great hesitancy over asserted connections
between liberty and the text. Literal connection is not the problem. Liberty
appears twice in the text (and, by comparison, equal protection only once).
But that connection, in itself, gives us only liberty as a cipher with a gloss:
"No person shall be... deprived... of liberty... without due process of
law .... " Since all that the gloss entails is "process"--however much is
"due-the cipher can be generalized with tolerable results. Thus, whatever
liberty amounts to, we can take it away so long as we allow you judge, jury,
counsel, and compulsory process. Drop the gloss of due process, however,
and the very generality and emptiness of our cipher threatens to turn into a
constitutional trump-a right that takes all other rights and powers. This is
constitutional law's "bad infinite." And this is the terror of Lochner.
Is there a way to tame the wild card of liberty? Ely suggests that we
reduce it to its gloss: "liberty" is a claim with only procedural remedies. This
fixes Lochner and Roe for good; but it also fixes Griswold and Moore. Can we
save liberty from Lochner without losing it to Ely?
Doctrinally, the Lochner opinion has very few moving parts, and so very
few potentially broken ones that we can identify and repair. But unless we
make sure of such repairs, the defense of privacy is likely to be futile. To
Peckham, who wrote the opinion, the case was simple. New York's maximum
hours legislation was to be examined on what are still embarrassingly familiar
principles of "constitutional restraint":
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State
or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to his personal liberty... ? 
95
Here the first among these parts appears last: it is the now legendary assertion
94. ELY, supra note I. at vii.
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
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of a "personal" liberty of contract. While groundless, perhaps, it is not alto-
gether textless. The Constitution mentions contracts once: "No state shall
pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts," says article I,
section 10, clause 1. But the Constitution hardly suggests an absolute privil-
ege to contract on conditions or terms entirely of one's own making. Indeed
the federal government meets no obstacle under the contracts clause even if it
should set out, flagrantly and directly (by forgiving debts, say), to dissolve
contracts as such. To the argument, then, that this cipher too can drop its
gloss-like liberty in the two due process clauses-we have an answer in the
text: by its very terms the protection of the right is limited to protection from
state violations. In that posture, the right cannot be altered by any reading of
the fourteenth amendment. 96 Is textual interpretation, then, the weak link in
Lochner? Hardly.
Anyone who would defend the various privacy decisions must concede
the weakness of the available textual links. They are there, no doubt, and so
the text does not foreclose them. But they are there as conceptual links only
when we substitute one gloss on liberty for another-the gloss of fundamental
rights, that is, for the gloss of due process. Why can't the "contractarians"
substitute one gloss for another? They can, of course, but with less assurance:
first, because they would assert a right that the text has glossed not as to
remedy (e.g., due process) but as to reach (i.e., the states cannot impair); and
second, because the gloss required to extend that reach (back from the states
to the federal government) is both novel and structurally surprising-although
not so surprising as to have deterred more or less the same structural move
under equal protection. 97
The interpretive going may be rougher, then, but the right to contract is
not in a different textual universe from the right to privacy. If it is argued that
contract is a less tractable concept than "privacy":--or even "family"--the
rejoinder is the same: it is less tractable, perhaps, but not wholly intractable.
Any concept of liberty put forward as a "locator" of fundamental constitu-
tional rights must be confined somehow without the textual gloss.98
Now the second, and often concealed, moving part in Lochner is the
view, the very dim view, of the police powers of the states. Peckham argues,
somewhat fatuously, that they are limited. After all, the majority cannot have
its way in everything:
Otherwise ... it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted
to conserve the morals, the health, or the safety of the people; such legislation
would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be.
The claim of the police power would be a mere pretext-become another and
96. See Boiling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497 (1953).
97. See. e.g., Gerety, Redefining Privacy., 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977).
98. Much the same holds for the first amendment's gloss that -Congress shall make no law .... - Did that
mean the Executive might? or the Judiciary? or the States? See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPRESSION 238 (1960).
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delusive name for the supreme sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from
constitutional restraint.99
The curious thing here is not that the police power, the majority's power,
should stop when it meets the right to contract. The logic of fundamental
rights still suggests just that. What is curious, and even bizarre, is the imposi-
tion of a generalized burden of justification upon state power whenever exer-
cised. In every case of state or federal action, says Peckham in effect, we
must look for justification under the "fair, reasonable, and appropriate"
standard. This standard is the third working part.
Criticism of Lochner has not neglected its "sweeping standard for
judicial review of a state law":
By equating a view that a law was unfair or inappropriate with a finding that it was
wholly arbitrary, this test was broad enough to permit courts to "substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies."' to
But this criticism misses the mark if it suggests that the standard suffers only
from overbreadth, as if to say that Lochner was yet another failure of judicial
restraint. Were that all, some trimming and hedging would be all the lesson
that these cases teach. But the standard of judicial review applied in Lochner
suggests much more.
Holmes put us on the wrong track when he began his dissent by saying
that "[t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain."' 0' Ever since, we have talked of Lochner in
terms of the Court's imposition of its own judgments of wisdom upon legisla-
tion already approved by the majority. That comes to a venial and not a
mortal sin, and one to which the Court has succumbed in many an era and
doctrine, both before and since. Still Peckham's singular damnation is secure.
The clue to it is his use of the word "pretext."
To any student of constitutional law, that word recalls a little heeded
suggestion of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.'02 "Should
Congress," the Chief Justice wrote,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of
objects not entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an
act was not the law of the land.10
3
Behind Marshall's warning was the idea of the federal government as one of
enumerated powers. This is a view irretrievably lost to us now by the settled
precedent of McCulloch itself, and by Marshall's interpretation therein of the
necessary and proper clause. It is in any case an idea of federal, not state,
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (emphasis added).
100. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156. 1167 (1980).
101. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
102. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
103. td. at 423 (emphasis added).
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power. Peckham simply asserts its relevance to the states, and indeed to all
government whatsoever. His is not merely an "economic theory with which
much of the nation disagrees"; it is a constitutional theory with which the
Constitution disagrees.
All three of Lochner's moving parts, then, come together in a curious
political theory: no government, it holds, can legislate without coercion; this
much is true enough. But liberty, it goes on, should never be coerced without
special-even emergency-justification; again, we have enough of the truth to
pass. But then comes the middle term: all coercion is necessarily upon liberty.
This is an absurdity.
Now you may say that Peckham qualified this theory with a notion of
"legislation of this character."'04 But to read his summary paragraph on the
question of "a labor law, pure and simple," is to understand that his principles
were absolutely general. It is not simply liberty of contract that gives the
general rule, subject to special exceptions. The presumed invalidity of the
police power is itself a general rule with Peckham. For the majority can only
act when it has very, very good reason to do so-for coal miners, perhaps, but
not for bakers. We have here, then, a standard of review premised on a
wholesale suspicion of democracy, a suspicion as pervasive and searching as
any now applied to race. For Peckham and his Court, the majority itself was a
suspect category.
"The question for the courts," Learned Hand wrote of Lochner, "is not
whether the problems have been wisely answered, but whether they can be
answered at all, or... are taboo."'0 5 At the other end of the century from
Lochner, the question is still apt: are there, should there be, court-imposed
taboos on legislation of certain kinds?
"Well," comes the retort, "what kinds do you have in mind?"
Hand had in mind what he called "the whole economic struggle." In a
marvelous understatement, he saw no "constitutional necessity that the state
should leave [it] untouched. . . ." For one thing, the "state" as we know it
never had, in England or America. For another, "the whole matter [of
economics] is yet to such an extent experimental that no one can with justice
apply to the concrete problems the yardstick of abstract economic theory."
He elaborated:
We do not know, and we cannot for a long time learn, what are the total
results of such "meddlesome interference with the rights of the individual." He
would be as rash a theorist who should assert with certainty their beneficence, as
he who would sweep them all aside by virtue of some pragmatical theory of
"natural rights." The only way in which the right, or the wrong, of the matter may
be shown, is by experiment; and the legislature, with its paraphernalia of com-
104. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45. 56 (1905).
105. Hand. Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 507 (1908).
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mittee and commission, is the only public representative really fitted to experi-
ment. 106
This paragraph even now brings a welcome concreteness to discussion of the
Lochner heresy. Judges may be as wise as legislators; but they have no
time-or method-to experiment. They look backwards rather to assign
rights and duties. It is the business of legislatures to look forward: to investi-
gate and to debate, of course, but also to risk failure, to guess at results, to
wager public funds-all without certainty and without finality. In this sense,
the contrast between the new substantive due process and the old is not so
much between "economic" rights and "personal" rights as between two
views of democracy. In one, the majority, like classical liberalism's night
watchman, makes its appointed rounds upon a fixed schedule of police
powers and duties. Its only discretion lies in response to emergencies unfore-
seen by those from whom it took its key and task. In the other view, the
majority, now something of a scientist, has a broad discretion to experiment
as it will. It is subject only to a discrete set of restraints rooted in the guar-
antees of fundamental equality and liberty.
"But," comes the objection, "all of life is an experiment, not merely 'the
whole economic struggle.' None of it can be taboo. All is open to experimen-
tation, and to legislation." All of it short of an outright constitutional ban, he
must mean: "A state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is
restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United
States or of the State . ,,07 With this sole qualification, Hand (and
Holmes) took up this position, arguing for it rigorously and sincerely. "A
man's 'time' is his life," Hand could write, "and to control it is to control
what is often dearer to him than his health or personal safety." 0 3 Dearer
even, we might say, than his sexuality or his family. For the distinction
between "economic" rights and "personal" rights was entirely lost to Hand
and Holmes (as it is now, sometimes, entirely lost to Mr. Justice Stewart).1' 9
But then their strictures on the judicial prerogative went much beyond liberty.
Both Hand and Holmes would have dissented vigorously, with Harlan, from
Baker v. Carr."0
Ely and most of the rest of us can take no such uncompromising stand.
"The impossibility of clause-bound interpretivism" must hold across the
board, if at all. Were we to insist on "pure interpretivism," we would have
not only much less liberty adjudication but much less equality (and even due
106. Id. at 507-08. quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
107. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
108. Hand, Due Process of Last, and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495, 504 (1908).
109. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: Al Erhtuniation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34. 45-50 ("the Doubtful Distinction
Between Economic and Civil Rights").
110. 369 U.S. 186. 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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process) adjudication as well; what besides fourteenth amendment liberty
makes the states answerable for violations of the fourth amendment-or the
first? We have made too much of this perhaps-for surely an agile interpre-
tivist can wiggle free of the "lapses" in original intent. But better too much
than too little. Liberty should no more be laid to rest by Lochner v. New
York"' than equality by Plessy v. Ferguson."
2
What, then, remains in the way of liberty adjudication? Once we have
done with Lochner's terrors and equality's stringencies, the surest answer is
not so much Ely's theory as our own. For while Ely has given to equality a
conceptual structure and integrity, we have given nothing of the kind to liberty
itself. The judges have done their common law best, but the scholars have
done little to help. So we are back where we began, with the prospect of doing
without privacy. Only now it should be clear what can be done to prevent it:
we who have the time for theory must give an account of liberty that is
definitive enough for adjudication, consistent with our theory of democracy,
and drawn, if not from the text itself, from the history and tradition-moral and
legal-that give to the text its sense and purpose.
III. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
112. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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